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IMPROVING PATIENT SAFETY THROUGH POLICY:
IS PAYMENT REFORM UP TO THE TASK?
Andrew M. Ryan*
I. THE SCOURGE OF HOSPITAL ACQUIRED CONDITIONS
Hospital acquired conditions (HACs) are adverse events exper-
ienced by patients as a result of the care they receive. HACs lead to
substantial patient harm and health system spending. For example,
postoperative venous thromboembolism, ventilator-associated pneu-
monia, and central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI)
increase the probability of inpatient mortality by 10.4%, 14.4%, and
18.5% and are associated with increases in spending of $8,000,
$21,000, and $17,000 per hospitalization, respectively.1 Together,
HACs contribute to more than 90,000 deaths2 annually and annual
spending in excess of $30 billion.3
II. USING PAYMENT REFORM TO IMPROVE QUALITY
Evidence of the societal burden of HACs ignited the quality move-
ment in health care.4 Two key reports from the Institute of
Medicine—To Err is Human5 and Crossing the Quality Chasm6—ad-
dressed medical errors and shortcomings in patient safety as system-
atic problems in U.S. health care. Quality improvement interventions,
* Associate Professor, Department of Health Management and Policy, University of
Michigan.
1. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, PUB. NO. 16-0006-EF, 2013 ANNUAL
HOSPITAL-ACQUIRED CONDITION RATE AND ESTIMATES OF COST SAVINGS AND DEATHS
AVERTED FROM 2010 TO 2013 5 (Oct. 2015), https://www.ahrq.gov/sites/default/files/publica
tions/files/hacrate2013_0.pdf.
2. R. Monina Klevens et al., Estimating Health Care-Associated Infections and Deaths in U.S.
Hospitals, 2002, 122 PUB. HEALTH REP. 160, 160 (2007).
3. R. DOUGLAS SCOTT II, THE DIRECT MEDICAL COSTS OF HEALTHCARE-ASSOCIATED IN-
FECTIONS IN U.S. HOSPITALS AND THE BENEFITS OF PREVENTION 1, 7–8 (Mar. 2009), https://
www.cdc.gov/hai/pdfs/hai/scott_costpaper.pdf.
4. Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1855, 1857 (1994).
5. INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 3–4 (Linda T.
Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
6. COMM. ON QUALITY HEALTH CARE IN AM., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW
HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 2–4 (2001).
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such as the Michigan Keystone Initiative7 and efforts from the Insti-
tute for Healthcare Improvement,8 were launched to combat these
widespread shortcomings. However, until recently, few policy initia-
tives have specifically targeted HAC reduction. This changed as a re-
sult of two key developments. First, advances in data storage and
computing allowed researchers to move beyond primary data collec-
tion and single-site studies to leverage massive administrative claims
data to evaluate quality performance across hospitals.9 This in turn
allowed policymakers to create new programs measuring and profiling
the relative quality of hospitals. Second, researchers developed mea-
sures of HACs that could be calculated using administrative claims.10
While the use of claims-based measures of HACs remains controver-
sial, their development paved the way for policies that employ hospi-
tal-level profiling of patient safety.
Once hospital quality performance could be profiled, payers could
begin to link reimbursement to quality through new programs. Finan-
cial incentives to improve health outcomes and reduce spending
growth (known as value-based payments) have been applied widely in
the hospital setting. Nonetheless, how these programs can be designed
to improve care remains unclear.11 Early results from the Hospital
Quality Incentive Demonstration—Medicare’s first experience tying
hospital quality performance with reimbursement—suggested that
modest financial incentives for clinical process measures could im-
prove quality of care.12 Subsequent research, however, challenged
whether these improvements translated into improvements in patient
outcomes and reductions in spending.13 More recent evidence indi-
cates that Hospital Value-Based Purchasing, the first nationwide
value-based payment program initiated by the Centers for Medicare
7. Peter Pronovost et al., An Intervention to Decrease Catheter-Related Bloodstream Infections
in the ICU, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2725, 2726 (2006).
8. Healthcare-Associated Infections, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, http://www.ihi
.org/explore/HAI/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
9. Gary I. Cohen & Gabrielle Rocque, Measuring Quality of Care: Past, Present, and Future,
ASCO DAILY NEWS (May 26, 2016), https://am.asco.org/daily-news/measuring-quality-care-past-
present-and-future.
10. See generally Lisa I. Iezzoni, Assessing Quality Using Administrative Data, 127 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 666 (1997).
11. Andrew M. Ryan & Cheryl L. Damberg, What Can the Past of Pay-for-Performance Tell
Us About the Future of Value-Based Purchasing in Medicare?, 1 HEALTHCARE 42, 43 (2013).
12. Peter K. Lindenauer et al., Public Reporting and Pay for Performance in Hospital Quality
Improvement, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 486, 487 (2007).
13. Andrew M. Ryan, Effects of the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration on
Medicare Patient Mortality and Cost, 44 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 821, 822 (2009); Ashish K. Jha et
al., The Long-Term Effect of Premier Pay for Performance on Patient Outcomes, 366 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1606, 1607 (2012).
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and Medicaid Services (CMS), did not document, track, or report pro-
cess, patient experience, or mortality over the short term or long
term.14 However, evidence from the Hospital Readmission Reduction
Program (HRRP)—which penalized hospitals with high rates of read-
mission within 30 days for discharge—suggests that the program has
worked to reduce readmissions.15
Given the lackluster results from other value-based payment pro-
grams, the apparent success of the HRRP is an important policy de-
velopment. It suggests that, if designed appropriately, national
payment reform can improve quality of care. The HRRP appeared to
succeed while other programs failed due to a larger financial incen-
tive, a simpler incentive design, and a penalty-based design.16 To-
gether, this evidence suggests that while financial incentive programs
do not always work, well-designed incentive programs have the poten-
tial to improve patient and system outcomes.
III. FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND HOSPITAL
ACQUIRED CONDITIONS
The first major policy effort to reduce HACs came in 2008, when
CMS ceased paying hospitals for the incremental costs of treating cer-
tain HACs. The program initially targeted “never events,” including
foreign objects left in patients after surgery, Stage 3 or 4 pressure ul-
cers after admission, and death or disability associated with intravas-
cular air embolism.17 It then expanded to include additional
conditions, including catheter-associated urinary tract infection
(CAUTI), manifestations of poor glycemic control, falls, trauma, and
surgical-site infections after certain procedures.18 This program relied
on claims submitted to CMS by hospitals to identify the presence of
HACs.
Overall, it is unclear whether this program has improved patient
safety. One evaluation found that the program was associated with
14. Andrew M. Ryan et al., Changes in Hospital Quality Associated with Hospital Value-Based
Purchasing, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2358, 2359 (2017) (discussing the long term); Andrew M.
Ryan et al., The Early Effects of Medicare’s Mandatory Hospital Pay-for-Performance Program,
50 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 81, 84 (2015) (discussing the short term).
15. Rachael B. Zuckerman et al., Readmissions, Observation, and the Hospital Readmissions
Reduction Program, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1543, 1551 (2016).
16. Tim Doran et al., Impact of Provider Incentives on Quality and Value of Health Care, 38
ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 449, 460 (2016).
17. Grace M. Lee et al., Effect of Nonpayment for Preventable Infections in U.S. Hospitals, 367
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1428, 1429 (2012).
18. Sanjay Saint et al., Catheter-Associated Urinary Tract Infection and the Medicare Rule
Changes, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 877, 879 (2009).
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reductions in CLABSI and CAUTI, but not with reductions in injuri-
ous falls, or pressure ulcers.19 Another evaluation found no impact of
the program on CLABSI, CAUTI, or ventilator-associated pneumo-
nia.20 The researchers posited that, among other challenges, incentives
in the program may not have been sufficiently large to motivate be-
havior change.21 Taken together, research suggests that the incentives
embodied in the CMS non-payment for HAC policies were not suffi-
cient to substantially improve patient safety.
The Hospital Acquired Condition Reduction Program (HACRP)
was created by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA) to enhance the pressure on hospitals to reduce HACs. The
statute that created the program—specified in Section 3008 of the
ACA—was quite vague, assigning the Department of Health and
Human Services the responsibility for determining features of the pro-
gram, which would begin no later than fiscal year (FY) 2015.22 The
program regulations were ultimately codified under the FY 2014 final
rule for the Inpatient Prospective Payment System.23 Under this rule,
starting in 2015, acute care hospitals in the worst quartile of HAC
rates have been penalized 1% of Medicare payments.24 The HACRP
profiles HAC rates using two domains: Domain 1 is the PSI-90 com-
posite, and Domain 2 is the Healthcare-Associated Infections tracking
system provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s
National Healthcare Safety Network.25 In FY 2015, Domain 2 mea-
sures included CLABSI and CAUTI measures. The two domains are
assigned points and combined using a weighted average. In FY 2015,
Domain 1 received 35% of the weight and Domain 2 received 65%.
Over time, Domain 2 will receive a larger relative weight.
19. Teresa M. Waters et al., Effect of Medicare’s Nonpayment for Hospital-Acquired Condi-
tions: Lessons for Future Policy, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 347, 350 (2015).
20. See Lee et al., supra note 17, at 1435.
21. Id.
22. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001).
23. Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. 50495, 50496 (Aug. 19,
2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413, 414, 419, 424, 482, 485, and 489).
24. Amanda Cassidy, Medicare’s Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program, HEALTH
AFF. HEALTH POL’Y BRIEF (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief
.php?brief_id=142.
25. See id. “PSI-90 composite” is the shortened name for the Patient Safety of Selected In-
dicators Composite created by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. PSI 90 Fact
Sheet, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, https://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/
news/psi90_factsheet_faq.pdf (last updated Aug. 31, 2016). The name of the composite has since
been modified to the Patient Safety and Adverse Events Composite because the composite now
accounts for “patient harm resulting from a patient safety event.” Id.
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The design of the HACRP is more similar to the HRRP than to
Hospital Value-Based Purchasing: it is penalty-based, and the per-
formance criteria are based on absolute levels of performance for a
relatively narrow set of measures. As a result, there is some reason for
optimism that the HACRP may also improve care, reducing HACs
and improving patient safety. Nonetheless, there are a number of con-
troversies and challenges surrounding the program that have the po-
tential to undermine its impact on patient safety.
IV. MEASURING HOSPITAL ACQUIRED CONDITIONS USING
ADMINISTRATIVE DATA IS FRAUGHT WITH CHALLENGES
A key difference between a hospital readmission and an HAC is
observability. Notwithstanding some controversy about hospitals’ use
of “observation” as a substitute for an inpatient admission,26 the pres-
ence of a readmission within thirty days of discharge from a prior ad-
mission is exceedingly clear to both patients and to CMS. The same is
not true for an HAC. HACs, by definition, occur as a result of care
received during a hospitalization. They typically will not be the main
reason why a patient was admitted to the hospital. Consequently, they
will rarely be the principal diagnosis for the admission. Instead, HACs
are typically determined on the basis of secondary diagnoses. Because
principal diagnoses determine payment, through classification into Di-
agnosis Related Groups (DRGs), hospitals and CMS pay close atten-
tion to how principal diagnoses are coded. While used to classify
patients into a higher severity level (based on the MS-DRG classifica-
tion),27 secondary diagnoses are less central to hospital payment. As a
result, the information contained in secondary diagnoses has tradition-
ally been less complete and less reliable.
From the perspective of measuring HACs, this creates two
problems. First, because secondary diagnoses are not coded as dili-
gently, a patient could experience an HAC that does not make it onto
the claim sent by hospitals to CMS. Second, comorbidities that are
coded as secondary diagnoses may either be a result of care received
in the hospital (an HAC) or may instead be “present on admission”
26. See Zuckerman et al., supra note 15, at 1544; Amber K. Sabbatini & Brad Wright, Exclud-
ing Observation Stays from Readmission Rates—What Quality Measures Are Missing, 378 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2062, 2062 (2018).
27. The MS-DRG classification system is used by CMS to group patients into groups of diag-
noses, adjusted by severity, which is then used to pay hospitals under the Inpatient Prospective
Payment System. For instance, hip replacement or joint replacement without a major condition
category (i.e., a lower severity case) would be classified to MS-DRG 470, while joint replace-
ment with a major condition category (i.e., a higher severity case) would be classified to MS-
DRG 469.
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when a patient arrives at the hospital. Until recently, there was no way
to distinguish between these possibilities. To address this issue, begin-
ning in FY 2008, CMS required hospitals to document whether each
secondary diagnosis was present-on-admission. These present-on-ad-
mission indicators have helped, but not fully addressed challenges
measuring HACs.28







2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
PSI-90 score
Source: Authors’ analysis of MedPAR claims, 2009-2014
Despite the challenges associated with measuring HACs using
claims, efforts to profile and reward hospital performance on HACs
have continued. The AHRQ PSI, and the composite measure PSI-90,
represent the state of the art in HAC measurement. The PSI-90 in-
cludes the HACs that are most reliably identified in claims. Version
5.0 of the PSI-90 includes CLABSI, pressure ulcer, iatrogenic pneu-
mothorax, postoperative hip fracture, pulmonary embolism or deep
28. Hamsa Bastani et al., Evidence of Upcoding in Pay-for-Performance Programs 2 (July 13,
2015) (Research Paper) (on file with Stanford University Graduate School of Business), https://
www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/publications/evidence-upcoding-pay-performance-pro
grams; Margriet Fokkema et al., The Impact of the Present on Admission Indicator on the Accu-
racy of Administrative Data for Carotid Endarterectomy and Stenting, 58 J. VASCULAR SURGERY
32, 35–37 (2014).
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vein thrombosis, postoperative sepsis, postoperative wound dehis-
cence, or accidental puncture or laceration. To arrive at a hospital-
level metric, these measures are risk- and reliability-adjusted and
weighted based on the frequency with which these HACs occur.29 Ver-
sion 6 of the PSI-90 introduced three new measures (perioperative
hemorrhage or hematoma, postoperative acute kidney injury, and
postoperative respiratory failure), eliminated one measure (CLABSI),
and re-weighted the indicators based on their relative harm.30 Figure 1
shows a “turnip plot” hospital-level distribution of performance on
the PSI-90 between 2009 and 2014. Substantial variation in hospital
performance over time on the PSI-90 suggests possible improvement
for many hospitals.
Despite the technical sophistication of the PSI-90, many have criti-
cized the validity of the measure.31 Underlying these critiques is the
insight that claims are particularly ill-suited to identify the clinically
complicated and often ambiguous HACs.32 The greater nuance in the
ICD-10 classification may help to alleviate some of these challenges,
but it is too early to tell.33
Perhaps recognizing this, hospital performance on the PSI-90 re-
ceived a weight of only 35% in the first year of the HACRP and is
scheduled to decline further. Instead, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention’s National Healthcare Safety Network Healthcare-As-
sociated Infection measures are weighted more heavily in the pro-
gram. Instead of being calculated through claims, these measures
require hospitals to document the presence of specific HACs within a
separate data-entry platform. While this system allows for more
clinical nuance, it is subject to many concerns raised about the PSI-
90.34 For instance, hospitals often considered to have the highest tech-
nical quality (i.e., academic medical centers and those engaged in
29. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, PUB. NO. 15-M053-4-EF, PATIENT
SAFETY INDICATORS (2015), https://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/Downloads/Modules/PSI/
V50/PSI_Brochure.pdf.
30. PSI 90 Fact Sheet, supra note 25.
31. Bradford D. Winters et al., Validity of the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality
Patient Safety Indicators and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Hospital-Acquired Condi-
tions: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 54 MED. CARE 1105, 1105 (2016).
32. Jennifer A. Meddings et al., Hospital Report Cards for Hospital-Acquired Pressure Ulcers:
How Good Are the Grades?, 159 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 505, 508, 512 (2013).
33. Amy K. Rosen et al., Using Estimated True Safety Event Rates Versus Flagged Safety
Event Rates: Does It Change Hospital Profiling and Payment?, 49 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1426,
1439 (2014). ICD-10 is the 10th revision of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases.
Beginning in October 2015, CMS has used the ICD-10 for documentation related to all claims.
34. Keith F. Woeltje et al., Data Requirements for Electronic Surveillance of Healthcare-Asso-
ciated Infections, 35 INFECTION CONTROL HOSP. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1083, 1085 (2014).
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quality improvement initiatives) have been more likely to perform
poorly on these measures.35 In addition, the extremely low event rates
for the CLABSI and CAUTI outcomes suggest that these measures
have limited ability to discriminate across hospitals. A single CLABSI
or CAUTI frequently pushes hospitals into the penalty range under
the HACRP.36
V. MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN THE HOSPITAL ACQUIRED
CONDITION REDUCTION PROGRAM MAY LEAD TO
HETEROGENEITY IN HOSPITALS’ RESPONSES
Under the HACRP, hospitals have the opportunity to improve
measured performance through both clinical and administrative activi-
ties. For instance, Sanjay Saint et al. identified a number of specific
clinical improvements that hospitals could employ to reduce urinary
tract infections. These include using indwelling urinary catheters only
when medically indicated; inserting and maintaining indwelling cathe-
ters using the proper technique; developing systems to encourage the
removal of catheters when they are no longer indicated and educating
clinicians about the appropriate use and interpretation of urinalysis
and urine culture.37 Related strategies, such as improving hand hy-
giene, performing subclavian vein insertion, and reducing non-essen-
tial central venous catheters, have been developed to reduce
CLABSI.38
However, hospitals also have the potential to improve measured
performance through narrowly focusing on administrative activities to
improve performance and avoid penalties under the program. This in-
cludes increases in coding comorbidities as “present on admission”
and an overall increase in coded severity to make patient populations
look sicker under risk-adjustment. Recent evidence suggests that im-
provement in pneumonia mortality is due in large part to re-classify-
ing index admissions.39 Increases in hospitals’ coding of patient
severity is also responsible for much of the improvement observed
35. Ravi Rajaram et al., Hospital Characteristics Associated with Penalties in the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program, 314 JAMA 375,
375–77 (2015).
36. Richard L. Fuller et al., Is the CMS Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program a
Valid Measure of Hospital Performance?, 32 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 254, 254 (2017).
37. See Saint et al., supra note 18, at 878.
38. Elizabeth Pfoh et al., Interventions to Improve Hand Hygiene Compliance: Brief Update
Review, in RAND CORP., AHRQ PUB. NO. 13-E001-EF, MAKING HEALTH CARE SAFER II: AN
UPDATED CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE FOR PATIENT SAFETY PRACTICES 67 (2013).
39. Michael W. Sjoding et al., Gaming Hospital-Level Pneumonia 30-Day Mortality and Read-
mission Measures by Legitimate Changes to Diagnostic Coding, 43 CRITICAL CARE MED. 989,
994 (2015).
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under the HRRP.40 Together, this suggests that hospitals may engage
in improvements in clinical care along with administrative changes in
response to incentive programs such as the HACRP, resulting in dif-
ferent implications for patient and system outcomes.
VI. EVOLUTION OF POLICY THROUGH CONTINUED RULEMAKING
Whatever limitations may be present in HACRP as currently consti-
tuted, policy can evolve to address them. Both Hospital Value-Based
Purchasing and the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program have
undergone substantial revision in subsequent rule-making for the In-
patient Prospective Payment System. Only by acquiring more evi-
dence can we understand the conditions under which financial
incentives will improve quality and spending. Ultimately, the success
of the HACRP will be tied to the ability to accurately and effectively
measure HACs while minimizing gaming and unintended conse-
quences. Without achieving this balance, the HACRP is unlikely to
substantially improve patient safety.
40. Andrew M. Ibrahim et al., Association of Coded Severity with Readmission Reduction Af-
ter the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 290, 291 (2018).
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